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I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the implications that global climate change may have
on Minnesota’s economy, environment, and quality of life, Governor Tim
Pawlenty announced the Next Generation Energy Initiative, a state program
with the goals of increasing energy efficiency among electrical and natural
utilities by requiring Minnesota utilities to provide twenty-five percent of
electricity from renewable sources by 2025 and lowering statewide
greenhouse gas emissions by fifteen percent by 2015, thirty percent by
2025, and eighty percent by 2050. 1 Pursuant to this initiative, the state
legislature passed the Next Generation Energy Act of 2007 (NGEA).2
Five years after its enactment, the NGEA is under attack. 3 On
November 2, 2011, North Dakota commenced an action against Minnesota in
an effort to strike down the portion of the NGEA that prohibits the
importation of any power that would contribute to the state’s carbon dioxide
emissions based on, among other things, its alleged violation of the
Commerce Clause. 4 Despite North Dakota’s protest, the NGEA does not
violate the Commerce Clause and will survive this challenge unscathed, as
the law is not facially discriminatory, serves an important local purpose that
outweighs any incidental burden on interstate commerce, and satisfies the
Pike standard.5
In Part II of this paper, I will review the NGEA, including the
provisions currently under scrutiny. 6 In Part III, I will examine North
Dakota’s previous challenge to Minnesota’s carbon policy and analyze the
current litigation regarding the NGEA.7 Then in Part IV, I will examine the
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 8 In Part V, I will assess both
North Dakota and Minnesota’s Commerce Clause arguments. 9 Finally, in
Part VI I will conclude that the NGEA does not violate the Commerce
Clause.10

1

Alternative Fuels — Federal and State Legislation, MINN. POLLUTION
CONTROL AGENCY, http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/topics/energy/alternative-fuels/
alternative-fuels-legislation.html (last visited May 9, 2012).
2
MINN. STAT. § 216C.05 (2010).
3
See infra Part III.
4
See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part V.
6
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See infra Part V.
10
See infra Part VI.
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II. THE NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT OF 2007
The NGEA mandates the following:
(1) the per capita use of fossil fuel as an energy input be
reduced by 15 percent by the year 2015, through increased
reliance on energy efficiency and renewable energy
alternatives; and (2) 25 percent of the total energy used in
the state be derived from renewable energy resources by the
year 2025.11
In order to achieve these goals, the NGEA prohibits any person (1) from
constructing in Minnesota a “new large energy facility that would contribute
to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions”12, (2) “import[ing] or
commit[ting] to import from outside the state power from a new large energy
facility that would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide
emissions”13, and (3) “enter[ing] into a long-term power purchase agreement
that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”14 The
NGEA defines “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions” as “the
total annual emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity
within the state and all emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of
electricity imported from outside the state and consumed in Minnesota.”15
This includes “[e]missions . . . associated with transmission and distribution
line losses . . . .”16
III. CHALLENGING THE NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT
Although the provisions discussed above are the center of North
Dakota’s present action against Minnesota, they represent only the latest
installment of North Dakota’s displeasure with Minnesota’s carbon policy.17
A. In re Quantification of Environmental Costs
In 1993, the Minnesota Legislature passed a law that “attempted to
install environmental costs as a factor in resource planning decisions made
by the [Public Utilities Commission (PUC)].”18 The PUC set interim cost
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

MINN. STAT. § 216C.05 (2010).
MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3(1) (2010).
MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 3(2) (2010).
MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 3(3) (2010).
MINN. STAT. §216H.03 subd. 2 (2010).
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App.

1998).
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values on five air emissions, including carbon dioxide. 19 After setting the
interim values, the PUC initiated a contested case before an administrative
law judge (ALJ) to set final values. 20 The ALJ recommended setting the
environmental costs of CO2 at $.28–$2.92 per ton, varying by geography.21
The PUC eventually set the environmental cost values of CO2 at $.30–$3.10
per ton for each of the geographic areas identified by the ALJ.22 One of the
geographic areas identified by the PUC was the area within 200 miles of the
border.23 Several parties then requested rehearing or reconsideration based on
the geographic distinctions, which the PUC granted.24 After reconsideration,
the PUC removed cost value on the 200 mile range, even though the PUC
believed it could require out-of-state utilities to use the value.25 Relators, a
nonprofit trade association that represented lignite fuel producers, users, and
suppliers (including the state of North Dakota), and an environmental
coalition then petitioned for writ of certiorari on the issue of the carbon
dioxide values.26
After finding the case ripe for review, the court addressed the
environmental coalition’s argument that the PUC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, and against legislative intent, when it decided to set
environmental costs for carbon dioxide in the 200 mile range at zero, even
though it had previously determined it was practical to do so.27 The court
sided with the PUC in holding that the PUC’s decision to remove the carbon
dioxide value could be characterized as a decision to adhere to statutory
language and thus was not reversible error.28
Although the court decided the case on other grounds, one can gain a
sense of the history and circumstances surrounding North Dakota’s
continued fight against Minnesota’s energy policy. 29 In addition, the
underlying argument in this case was based on the dormant Commerce
Clause theory, which is the same theory North Dakota Attorney General
Wayne Stenehjem (Stenehjem) has indicated will be the center of his case
against the NGEA.30

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id. at 797.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 797.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 801.
28
Id.
29
Id. See also supra Part III.A.
30
See Patrick Zomer, Note, The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 60, 61–62 (2010); Christopher
Bjorke, N.D. Likely to Sue Minnesota over Carbon Tax, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 29, 2009,
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_a6fafd5a-f409-11de-bb24-001cc4c03286.
html.
20

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6

4

Braun: Next Generation Energy Act

2013]

NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT

483

B. North Dakota v. Swanson
North Dakota first voiced its intention to commence an action
against Minnesota when Stenehjem told the Bismarck Tribune on December
29, 2009 that it “is very likely that we will be suing the state of Minnesota.”31
Indicating the strength of their resolve, the North Dakota Legislature
approved a litigation war chest of $500,000. 32 On November 2, 2011,
Stenehjem made good on his threat and filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.33
1. The Complaint
In its complaint, North Dakota argued that the NGEA is
unconstitutional because of multiple violations of constitutional provisions.34
a. The Commerce Clause
North Dakota first argued that the NGEA violates the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as it “facially discriminates against the
Plaintiffs because it prohibits the importation” of power generated from
certain power plants in North Dakota into Minnesota.35 In addition, North
Dakota argued that the NGEA “facially discriminates against interstate
commerce because it exempts new large energy facilities located in
Minnesota and new large energy facilities owned by Minnesota-based
entities.” 36 The complaint goes on to state that these prohibitions unduly
burden interstate commerce and are not justified “by valid public welfare,
consumer protection, or procompetitive purpose unrelated to economic
protectionism.”37
b. The Supremacy Clause
Second, North Dakota argued that the NGEA violates the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because Congress has made it clear that it
intends to occupy the field of emissions regulations and the regulation of
31

Christopher Bjorke, N.D. Likely to Sue Minnesota over Carbon Tax, BISMARCK
TRIB., Dec. 29, 2009, http:// www.bismarcktribune.com/news/local/article_a6fafd5a-f40911de-bb24-001cc4c03286.html.
32
Jennifer Bjorhus, North Dakota vs. Minnesota: Dust-up over Carbon, STAR
TRIB., Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/business/81606907.html.
33
See infra Part 3.B.1.
34
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27–39, North
Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Amended
Complaint]. See also infra Part III.B.1.A–D.
35
Id. at 27.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 29.
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energy sales and transmission.38 Regarding the field of emissions regulations,
North Dakota cites case law surrounding the Clean Air Act that states there
exists “a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”39 North
Dakota argued that the NGEA “conflicts with the Clean Air Act because it
purports to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide.”40 Regarding the field of
electricity sales and transmission, North Dakota argued that pursuant to the
Federal Power Act and the authority delegated to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the federal
government acts as the exclusive regulator and the NGEA unlawfully
expands Minnesota’s regulatory prowess into the area of transmission of
electricity in interstate commerce.41 According to North Dakota, Minnesota’s
expansion into this field violates the Supremacy Clause, as Congress has
shown intent to occupy the field.42
c. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Next, North Dakota argued that the NGEA violates the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution by unfairly discriminating
against and imposing an unreasonable burden on citizens of other states.43
North Dakota contends that the NGEA imposes an unreasonable burden on
the citizens of North Dakota, especially those working in the lignite and coalpowered electricity industries, by giving preferential treatment to Minnesota
citizens and entities.44 North Dakota argued that this preferential treatment
negatively impacts employment opportunities for North Dakota citizens.45
North Dakota further contends that these practices embodied in the NGEA
do not bear a substantial relationship to the goals of the law nor does
Minnesota have a substantial reason for them.46
d. Due Process
In addition to the previous arguments, North Dakota alleged
deprivation of property without due process of law on the basis that
“Plaintiffs have property interests in the productive use of coal and other
resources that are . . . consumed in the creation and operation of facilities”
that are subject to the prohibition in the NGEA.47
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 29–34.
Id. at 30 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 30.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 35.
Id. at 38.
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Finally, North Dakota made one argument unrelated to the U.S.
Constitution: that the NGEA violates the prohibition of special legislation
provision of the Minnesota Constitution. 48 This provision states, “[t]he
legislature shall pass no local or special law . . . granting to any private
corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege,
immunity, or franchise whatever . . . .” 49 North Dakota argued that the
NGEA violates this provision by “grant[ing] special privileges and
immunities to several private corporations,” such as Essar Global, Steel
Dynamics, Inc., Excelsior Energy, Inc., Otter Tail Power Company, and
Great River Energy, by exempting them from the requirements of the
NGEA.50 According to North Dakota’s Amended Complaint, this violation
constitutes a defect in the legislative process thereby denying Plaintiffs due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.51
After setting forth its arguments, North Dakota moved for
declaratory judgment holding the NGEA unconstitutional, enjoining
Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson from enforcing the NGEA, and
awarding costs and expenses incurred during the litigation.52
2. The Answer
In its answer, Minnesota denied that the NGEA was unconstitutional
and provided the following three separate defenses:
(1) The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted; (2) The Amended Complaint is
barred in part by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) The
Amended Complaint fails in whole or in part otherwise for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.53
In addition, Minnesota asked the court to dismiss North Dakota’s complaint
with prejudice and award costs.54
3. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
After filing its answer, Minnesota filed a motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings.55 Minnesota moved the court to “dismiss counts II through
48

Id. at 37.
MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
50
Amended Complaint, supra note 34, at 38.
51
Id. at 38–39.
52
Id. at 39–40.
53
Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 16, North Dakota v.
Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Answer].
54
Id.
55
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, North Dakota
v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Motion].
49
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VI of [North Dakota’s] amended complaint, and to dismiss the Attorney
General as a party, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”56
An order was entered on September 30, 2012, granting the motion in
part and denying it in part. The court granted Minnesota’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Privileges and Immunities and Due
Process claims. The court also dismissed Attorney General Swanson as a
party to the claim. The court, however, denied the motion on the federal
preemption claims, finding North Dakota adequately alleged the Federal
Power Act and Clean Air Act preemptions.57 Though the preemption claims
persist at present, for the sake of brevity, this paper assumes that the court
will decide the case based on the Commerce Clause and focuses its
discussion accordingly.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The U.S. Constitution retains for the federal government the power
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian tribes.”58 The Constitution also provides that federal law
is supreme when federal and state laws conflict. 59 Together, these two
provisions act as an “express limitation upon state regulation of interstate
commerce”60 where Congress has acted. These provisions, however, do not
preclude a state from regulating some areas of interstate commerce.61
The dormant Commerce Clause is implicated when a state regulates
some aspect of interstate commerce where Congress has not enacted
legislation that would preempt the state action. 62 When this sequence of
events occurs, the courts must decide whether the state has “overstepped its
role in regulating interstate commerce” 63 and thereby violated the U.S.
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined two different lines of
analysis for determining whether a state action violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.64
First, “[w]hen a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests, [the Court has] generally struck down the

56

Id.
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 40, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11cv-03232 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 2012).
58
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
60
CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES
251 (2d ed. 2005).
61
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986).
62
MASSEY, supra note 60, at 252.
63
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
64
See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
57
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statute without further inquiry.”65 “Indeed, when the state statute amounts to
simple economic protectionism, a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’ has
applied.”66 Under these circumstances, state statutes are subjected to strict
scrutiny and are invalid “unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,”67 or the state “can
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a
legitimate local interest.”68
The second line of analysis, known as the Pike Test, stands for the
principle that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”69
Under either test, “the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute
on both local and interstate activity.”70 “There is no ‘clear line’ separating
those cases to which strict scrutiny applies and those to which the Pike [T]est
applies.”71
V. ASSESSING THE ARGUMENTS
Both North Dakota and Minnesota have strong arguments to make in their
favor. 72 This section of the paper analyzes arguments on each side and
attempts to identify the most persuasive.73
A. North Dakota’s Case
North Dakota has a strong argument that the NGEA violates the
Commerce Clause because the NGEA (1) is facially discriminatory, (2) is
discriminatory in practical effect, and (3) sets up a regulatory regime that has
impermissible extraterritorial effects.74

65

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986) (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978); Shafer v.
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640–44
(1982)).
66
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992) (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624).
67
Id. at 454.
68
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994).
69
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
70
Nathan E. Enrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause,
and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 266 (2008) (quoting BrownForman, 476 U.S. at 579).
71
Id.
72
See infra Part V.A–B.
73
See infra Part V.A–B.
74
See infra Part V.A.1–3.
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1. The NGEA is Facially Discriminatory.
North Dakota will most likely begin its argument by trying to
establish that the NGEA is facially discriminatory so that the district court’s
reasoning follows the first line of analysis detailed above.75 The benefit of
the court finding the NGEA facially discriminatory is that it raises the
standard of review to strict scrutiny; therefore, the court would be acting
under a presumption of per se invalidity. 76 This is similar to City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.77 In that case, a New Jersey law prohibited the
importation of any solid or liquid waste that originated anywhere outside
New Jersey until the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection determined that the solid or liquid waste could be
imported safely and promulgated regulations of such actions. 78 The
Commissioner promulgated regulations that permitted four categories of
waste to enter New Jersey.79 Landfill operators and cities in other states that
had agreements with the operators sued New Jersey and the Department of
Environmental Protection, arguing that the statute and regulations were
unconstitutional. 80 The trial court found the law an unconstitutional
limitation on interstate commerce. 81 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the law “advanced vital health and environmental
objectives with no economic discrimination against, and with little burden
upon, interstate commerce.” 82 The court also found that the Solid Waste
Disposal Act did not preempt the state statute.83 The U.S. Supreme Court
conducted its inquiry using the Pike Test, stating “[t]he crucial inquiry . . .
must be directed to determining whether [New Jersey’s law] is basically a
protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to
legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental.”84
In order to discern whether the New Jersey law was simply a
protectionist measure or whether it was directed at legitimate local concerns,
the Court looked first looked to the purpose of the statute itself.85 The Court
eventually held that the ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved
because:

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
See e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,544 (1949).
City of Philadelphia v. New. Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
Id. at 618–19.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id.
Id at 620.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 620.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
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whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the New
Jersey law] violates this principle of nondiscrimination.86
Therefore, the Court held that the law was unconstitutional because there
was no reason to treat the waste created outside the state differently from that
created inside the state.87
North Dakota will likely begin its argument by attempting to
analogize the NGEA with the New Jersey law in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.88 For example, North Dakota may argue that the NGEA “erect[ed] a
barrier against the movement of interstate trade” 89 similar to New Jersey’s
prohibition on the importation of waste by prohibiting the importation of
electric power that would increase the state’s level of carbon emissions.
Despite Minnesota’s good faith attempt to reduce the state’s carbon
emissions, North Dakota will likely emphasize that this purpose may not be
“accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from
outside the State unless there is some reason . . . to treat them differently.”90
Moreover, in City of Philadelphia, the Court held that the New Jersey law
was not equivalent to a quarantine law, which had been held constitutional as
a health-protective measure, 91 because the quarantine laws “did not
discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented
traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin.”92 Like the New Jersey law,
the NGEA does not prohibit the importation of certain articles in interstate
commerce because of their noxious nature; rather, as the argument goes, the
NGEA seeks to “saddle those outside the State” 93 with the burden of
improving Minnesota’s level of carbon emissions. If the Court finds this
argument convincing, it will likely strike down the NGEA as discriminatory
and unconstitutional.94

86

Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 629.
88
See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
89
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
90
Id. at 626–27.
91
Id. at 629; see Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935);
Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
92
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
93
Id.
94
See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
87
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2. The NGEA is Discriminatory in Practical Effect.
In addition to the facially discriminatory argument, North Dakota
may argue that the NGEA is discriminatory in practical effect.95 The NGEA
effectively prohibits a utility company from using new coal power to provide
electricity to its customers by prohibiting the construction of any new coal
plants within the state and importation of any coal power from outside the
state.96 As existing coal plants inside and outside the state are retired, utilities
providing electricity to Minnesotans will no longer be able to provide coal
power because Minnesota has no coal resources of its own and the utilities
will be unable to import coal for power generation purposes.97 Therefore, the
practical effect of the statute is to unlawfully prohibit the ability of North
Dakota coal companies and power plants from marketing coal power to
consumers in Minnesota.98
3. The NGEA Establishes an Impermissible Extraterritorial Regime.
Lastly, North Dakota may argue the extraterritorial effects of the
NGEA require the court to strike the law down as unconstitutional.99 The
Court in Healy v. Beer Institute articulated the extraterritorial facet of the
dormant Commerce Clause. 100 The Court in that case stated that it would
strike down extraterritorial language that “directly controls commerce
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State”101 as a per se violation of
the Constitution. Although the Court has not extensively articulated the
principle, it appears that the principle applies only to state laws that further
economic protectionism, and thus cannot be defended on the grounds of
health and safety regulations, which are subject to a far more deferential
review.102
One of the key elements of a state law that signals it will likely be
struck down based on the extraterritorial principle is a law that has a
predominant effect on conduct in other states.103 North Dakota will likely
emphasize that the NGEA greatly affects the conduct of utility companies in
North Dakota. 104 Indeed, the NGEA effectively removes Minnesota as a
market for North Dakota utility companies, the eventual conclusion of which
is the preclusion of the construction of coal-fired power plants in North
95

See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3 (2010).
97
Zomer, supra note 30, at 91–92.
98
See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
99
See infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
100
Healey v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
101
Id.
102
See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
103
See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 926 (2002).
104
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Dakota because construction and operation of such plants becomes
economically impractical without access to the Minnesota market. 105 This
situation will require that North Dakota utilities comply with the NGEA in
order to be able to sell power to consumers in Minnesota, thereby
“project[ing] [Minnesota’s] regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of [North
Dakota].”
106

B. Minnesota’s Defense
Despite North Dakota’s strong arguments, the NGEA will survive
this challenge because (1) the statute does not discriminate against articles of
commerce that come from outside Minnesota, (2) even if the law is
discriminatory, there are multiple reasons, aside from origin, to treat them
differently, and (3) the NGEA passes the Pike Test.107
1. The NGEA is Not Discriminatory.
As mentioned above, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey stands for
the proposition that a statute is invalid if it “discriminat[es] against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart
from their origin, to treat them differently.”108 Although North Dakota will
argue that the facts of the two cases are analogous, that is simply not the
case. 109 The coal moratorium does not discriminate “against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State” and therefore it is outside the
bounds of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.110 The coal moratorium is not
discriminatory because it both prohibits the use and generation of coal power
that has been imported from other states and restricts the use and generation
of coal power in Minnesota; thus, Minnesota is not simply prohibiting the
importation of all electricity generated outside the state – a purely
protectionist measure.111 Due to this distinction, coal power generated both
inside and outside the state will cease to be an option for utilities in
Minnesota because the coal moratorium prohibits the importation of coal
power from outside the state and will eventually force the retirement and
closure of existing coal plants in Minnesota.112
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Moreover, the coal moratorium has no effect on sales outside of the
state. 113 This is important because the lack of such effect means that the
NGEA does not require out-of-state commerce to be conducted according to
in-state terms, thereby avoiding any argument of extraterritorial reach.114 In
this sense, the NGEA does not discriminate against interstate commerce at
all.115
The coal moratorium’s negligible burden on interstate commerce and
its large local benefit preclude it from falling victim to a Commerce Clause
challenge like some similar state programs, such as California’s Low Carbon
Fuel Standard (LCFS). 116 The LCFS requires that the carbon intensity of
fuels used for transportation be reduced by ten percent from 2006 levels by
2020. 117 In order to accomplish this goal, the California Air Resources
Board requires fuel providers to determine the “carbon intensity” of fuel
throughout its entire lifecycle, including direct emissions from the burning of
the fuel and the emissions resulting from transporting the fuel to
California.118 Thus, the LCFS penalizes fuels produced in and transported
from other states.119 This means that products such as biofuels produced in
the Midwest have a higher carbon intensity number than biofuels produced in
California, even if the product is exactly the same. 120 For these reasons,
opponents of the program argued that the LCFS is discriminatory on its
face.121
The federal district court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Goldstene agreed and held that the LCFS discriminates against fuels
produced outside of California (thus subjecting the regulation to strict
scrutiny analysis) and impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct.122 The
district court also found that the LCFS provides a local benefit in reducing
global warming but that purpose could have been achieved through
nondiscriminatory means.123 Moreover, the district court held that based on
the purposes of the LCFS set forth in its guiding principles, the main
function of the program was economic protectionism.124 For these reasons,

113

See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
See Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995).
115
See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
116
Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2006) with MINN. STAT. §
216H.03, subd. 3(1) (2010).
117
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1079
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
118
Id.at 1080.
119
Id.
120
See id at.1081.
121
Id.
122
Id at 1105
123
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.2d 1071, 1093–94
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
124
Id. at 1086–90.
114

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/6

14

Braun: Next Generation Energy Act

2013]

NEXT GENERATION ENERGY ACT

493

the district court issued an injunction that prohibited the enforcement of the
LCFS program.125
Minnesota’s coal moratorium is distinguishable from California’s
LCFS program because, as mentioned above, the coal moratorium treats coal
power generated in and out of state in the same way and does not assign a
higher price to coal or coal power produced outside of the state.126 In this
way, the coal moratorium does not seek to regulate the coal power generation
companies and their practices that occur outside of the state in the same way
the LCFS does. 127 Because of these key differences, Minnesota’s coal
moratorium is not discriminatory on its face and therefore will not meet the
same fate as California’s LCFS program.128
2. The NGEA Treats Coal Power Differently for Reasons Other than
Origin
Even if a court does find that the NGEA discriminates against
articles of commerce, the NGEA will still survive this challenge. 129
Minnesota can still argue that there is a reason, apart from origin, to treat
coal power differently. 130 For instance, using coal to generate power is
carbon intensive and contributes more to atmospheric pollution than other
sources of power, and the NGEA treats all future coal generation the same,
regardless of its origin.131 Thus, rather than arbitrarily discriminating against
coal power because of its origin, Minnesota treats coal power differently than
other types of power because of its greater adverse effect on the
environment.132
There is another reason, other than origin, for Minnesota to treat coal
power differently: that the NGEA’s regulatory scheme is set up to avoid the
problem of carbon leakage, which would undermine Minnesota’s entire
carbon emissions reduction plan. 133 Carbon leakage occurs when a utility
company must comply with a carbon restriction within a jurisdiction and
instead of reducing its emissions, imports carbon intensive electricity from
outside the jurisdiction.134 If the NGEA were devoid of the coal moratorium,
the whole scheme would be ineffective in reducing Minnesota’s carbon
emissions because utilities would simply import coal power from other
125
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states. 135 Thus, the NGEA does not discriminate against coal power from
other jurisdictions as an economic protectionist measure; rather, the NGEA
discriminates against all coal power for the sake of establishing a coherent
regulatory scheme that cannot be bypassed via importation. 136 For these
reasons, even if the district court finds the NGEA is facially discriminatory,
it will uphold the law because it permissibly discriminates for reasons other
than origin.137
3. The NGEA Passes the Pike Test.
Because the district court will likely find that the coal moratorium is
not discriminatory, the court may look to the Pike standard in order to weigh
whether the coal moratorium, despite regulating “evenhandedly with only
‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce,”138 still runs afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause. The district court will not strike down the
nondiscriminatory law “unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”139 The NGEA
will survive judicial scrutiny under the Pike Test because the benefits from
reducing its carbon emissions outweigh the burden the NGEA places on
interstate commerce.140 Minnesota has a convincing argument that reducing
its carbon emissions has great value after the Supreme Court held as much in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.141 In that case, the Court
recognized that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and
well recognized.” 142 Therefore, steps taken to diminish a state’s carbon
emissions — and by extension global climate change — have benefits.143
Thus, the NGEA satisfies the Pike Test because the steps taken by the state
legislature to reduce the state’s carbon emissions have benefits that outweigh
the incidental burden placed on interstate commerce by the coal
moratorium.144
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the court has not yet dispensed with North Dakota’s
preemption arguments, the Commerce Clause issue will most likely control
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the decision reached in this case.145 Despite North Dakota’s protest, the coal
moratorium will survive unscathed because the law does not discriminate on
its face and even if it does, it discriminates for reasons other than origin, such
as the effectiveness of the overall carbon emissions reduction scheme and the
fact that using coal to generate power is carbon intensive and contributes
more to atmospheric pollution than other sources of power.146 In addition, the
NGEA satisfies the Pike standard because it regulates “evenhandedly with
only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce.”147 For these reasons, the
district court will reject North Dakota’s claim and uphold the
constitutionality of the NGEA.148
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